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PREFACE
The career of every professional military officer is profoundly
influenced by the interaction of four major factors—formal military
training and education, personal experience, the political atmosphere of
his service, and the social milieu in which his career evolves. The
formal instruction and training of cadets and officer-candidates form the
foundation and direction of an officer's career. During this crucial
period, the potential officer receives an education that will enable him
to communicate effectively, absorb theory and doctrine, and stimulate
participation in scholastic endeavor. Personal experience shapes and
molds the officer's attitude, gives impetus to individual qualities, and
solidifies his commitment to the profession of arms. For the majority of
officers, the initial posting to a Regular Army unit and, in particular,
his first combat assignment compose reference points or what is currently
termed "mind sets." Senior commanders and general -staff policy planners
often fabricate policy and command decisions on personal experience
recalled from many years past. The latter two factors directly involve
politics. Throughout an officer's career he cannot avoid the direct and
indirect effect of domestic political processes on the international
posture of the government which he serves. This is manifested primarily
in the arena of international relations and foreign policy. The degree
of influence depends in part on the character of the military establish-
ment and its perceived role in society.
These thoughts first came to me as a result of my service in the
Republic of Vietnam with the United States Army. Initially, I dismissed
these suppositions and any further analysis as simply the standard
skepticism of youth and idealistic search for answers that accompanied my
generation into the 1970's. Like many of my contemporaries, I tended to
view the wide range of controversial subjects, such as the student
activism in politics, the military draft, the Indo-China War and civil
rights as strictly moral dilemmas. However, as my perception matured, I
became more cognizant of the interplay and intricacies of politics and
social behavior. This cognizance was reinforced as a result of my
academic interest in political and military history. My chief area of
interest focused on the military and political history of the French Army
in the Third Republic. In my studies, I detected a striking number of
similarities between the French officer corps following the Franco-
Prussian War and the American officer corps after the Indo-China war.
The circumstances and magnitude of the two conflicts were obviously dis-
similar. However, within the development of each officer corps and
institutional framework, I found parallels. This furnished momentum in
my endeavor to satisfy my personal and professional curiousity.
I was further encouraged as a result of incredible good fortune. I
had the opportunity to examine and use the unpublished war diary of
General Joseph Bernard Valentin, whose military career coincided with the
period dating from the Franco-Prussian War through World War I. I will
introduce General Valentin more adequately in another section and will
discuss his role in the present work. However, he fits the characteris-
tic French officer of his day just as many senior officers and aspiring
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field grade officers can be stereotyped into roles in the American Army
in our own time. I do not intend to offer a translation of General
Valentin's memoirs, but only to use them to illustrate and, hopefully,
personalize the attitudes, trepidations, and prejudices of the French
officer corps in the period under study. In the paper I have used
General Valentin's comments to emphasize and support the thesis,
particularly the section treating the technical aspects of the French
Army's preparation for war. Though I have not extensively used his
comments, I believe my selections will sufficiently convey the emotional
intensity and thoughts of a generation of officers confronted with
inflexible military dogma and the vicissitudes of political involvement.
Also, this study is not intended to be a comparative analysis between
the American Army in the post Vietnam era and the French Army from 1871
to 1914. I only hope to take an historical perspective which, I sin-
cerely believe, is lacking in current doctrine and training psychology
within the commissioned ranks of our armed services.
The influential factors I mentioned in the opening paragraphs are as
relevant today as they were for the French officers in 1914. It is
important that they be comprehended or at least recognized. History is
replete with disastrous consequences when they are not.
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INTRODUCTION
Victory is a thing of the will
Ferdinand Foch, 1914
This epigram, so piquant in its absoluteness, embodied the French
war policy that sent thousands upon thousands to their deaths in World
War I. French generals were obsessed with the strategic and tactical
offensive. They attempted offensive after offensive in the vain hope of
obtaining a decisive victory over the abominable IzA BocJiza. The senior
officers who participated in this war were products of their training,
personal experiences, and the tumultuous political events in the late
19th and early 20th centuries. Their frame of reference extended back
over forty years to the Franco-Prussian War. They were deeply affected
by this cataclysm and the subsequent political and social controversies
that followed.
The period in French history from 1870 to 1914 provides the reader
with an historical profile of an army as it recovers from defeat,
experiences political and social distractions, and prepares for the next
war. This paper intends to examine the professional soldiers who
officered this army and concentrate on the major political, military, and
social events that influenced their role in French society. The thesis
will describe the sentiments and attitudes that pervaded the professional
officer corps and caused their estrangement from the main stream of
politico-social life and their inflexible devotion to principles that
1
2almost led to another military disaster, if not, in fact, moral negli-
gence. This work seeks to provide some comprehension of a generation of
combat officers who labored over forty years for the restoration of
French national pride and the exoneration of France's military force.
Famous military officers such as Ferdinand Foch, Philippe Pgtain,
and Joseph Joffre are traditional sources on matters pertaining to the
generation of military leadership in World War I. These officers occupied
top decision making positions in the French Army and obviously should be
consulted. However, it is equally important to consider the views and
perspectives of the multitude of senior officers who commanded frontline
regiments and divisions. What did they think about Allied strategy,
tactics, politics, and the enemy? How much did their military experi-
ences and past assignments influence World War I battlefields? One
recently found source that may furnish some insights into these interest-
ing questions is the unpublished war diary of General Joseph Bernard
Valentin, whose military career coincides with the period under study.
The diary has been made available to the author through the kindness of
his daughter and grand-daughter, who are currently residing in the United
States. It is important to consider and examine General Valentin's
diary because he is the epitome of his generation. He was a professional
soldier who possessed the qualities and characteristics of his genera-
tion, at least on the surface of his military record.
Joseph B. Valentin was born in January 1863 in the provincial town
of Saint Chinian in the Department of IseYe. His father was a successful
wool merchant who later entered politics and became an Assemblyman from
his department. His parents were well-to-do members of the local
3bourgeoisie who could afford to send their children to private Catholic
schools for their early education.
According to General Valentin's daughter, he wanted to become a
soldier since he had been seven years old. It is interesting to note
that this coincided with the defeat of France in 1870 by the emerging
German Empire. Of course, it is pure speculation on how much his child-
hood desire can be attributed to the stigma of defeat in the Franco-
Prussian War. But, it is reasonable that the memory of the defeat or
even the possibility of Valentin witnessing the arrival of German troops
for occupation duty had some impact on the formation of his attitude and
personality. General Valentin, like others in his social -economic class,
claimed a strong family tradition of military service. His grandfather
had been an officer in Napoleon's Gnandz Axmiz and several family members
had subsequently followed in the martial tradition.
He entered Saint-Cyr in 1883 and was commissioned a Second Lieuten-
ant in the 1st Colonial Infantry Regiment in 1885. His first assignment
took him to Annam (now Vietnam) for three years where he worked on
engineering projects around the city of Hue. He returned to France for a
brief stay, then departed for the Sudan in 1889 where he served until
1895, except for a brief tour in Senegal. During his tour in French
Africa he participated in several campaigns and was wounded in action
against hostile tribesmen. When not actively engaged in combat opera-
tions, Valentin directed his efforts towards topography and mapping. He
was cited several times for his work and in 1890 was promoted to captain.
In 1895 he returned to France after ten years in continuous colonial
service.
4In 1902, promotion to Major came for Valentin, and in 1910 to
Lieutenant Colonel, while he served in various units throughout France.
On the eve of World War I, he commanded the 27th Regiment garrisoned at
Dijon and like his fellow officers greeted with favor the opportunity for
la. RevancAe, revenge for the defeat of 1870-1871. One of General
Valentin's journal entries at the outset of World War I reflects the
ebullience and confidence that his generation felt for the moment that
had been the focus of so much of their personal and professional life.
At 2:30 pm on 15 August 1914, I went to the
head of the regiment, the 1st Battalion, as it
crossed the German boundry—Alsace and Lorraine.
Thirty minutes later I occupied the village of
Foulerey in annexed Lorraine. We did not shoot
once, the Germans vanished as if by magic.
We were the first to have the honor of
crossing the border among the units in the First
Army. This day will be a date remembered in
history. It is the beginning of la. Rzva.nc.kz.
15 August 1914
Early in the war, he was promoted to Colonel and commanded the lid
Btlgadz d' Inhawtznlz in the campaigns of 1914-1915. In 1917 he was
promoted to GznznxxJL dz BtUgadz and appointed commander of the Mid
Vivi&lon {la Gaulol6z). His unit participated in most major campaigns on
the Western Front. After the war he was promoted to Gznznal dz' Vlvl&lon
and occupied militario-political positions in Algeria and France. He
retired from active service in 1925 and died in 1938.
In his personal life, he followed the standard pattern for a
colonial soldier. He was a bachelor until mid-career and after his
service in the colonies. He married in 1896 and had one daughter, who
was reared and educated in a private school for officers' daughters. He
apparently was a yery artistic man, who was interested in drawing and
writing. His diary is filled with samples of his engineering and
fortification projects. He was an engineer by training who worked on
several landscaping projects while in the colonies. In his diary he
drew sketches of fortifications and other military subjects with
explanatory annotations which indicated more than a casual interest in
military topics in many areas.
During the years 1914 to 1918 he kept a set of diaries to record his
thoughts and to comment privately on a variety of subjects. His candid
thoughts and observations as recorded in the 1914 diary provide important
source material for this thesis.
This project is intended to be the foundation for future research
and commentary on the study of French officers in World War I. Conse-
quently, much of the paper is devoted to background information of the
French officer corps and its role in the Third Republic. In order to
accomplish this task, the paper is divided into topics that discuss
significant periods and events in the development of the French officer
corps and the French Army. Of prime importance is the treatment of major
historical developments in the French Army from 1789 to 1870. This is
necessary to comprehend fully the magnitude of the disaster of Metz and
Sedan in 1870. Like all national military organizations, the French Army
regarded its traditions and heritage as a necessity for effective con-
tinuity. In this vein, a discussion of the Franco-Prussian War provides
the setting for the catastrophe in 1870-1871 which produced the Third
Republic. Significant features of this conflict will be addressed with-
out presenting a campaign history of the war.
6The chapter addressing the Army in the Third Republic contains the
substance of my effort to define the relationship between the Army and
the State, the soldier and the politician. Throughout this period one
problem without precedent in France emerged to dominate the relationship
between the Army and the State: the coexistence of a republican regime
with increasing democratic ideals and a large standing army, officered
by a caste of professional soldiers. This situation greatly strained
the tenuous nature and aggravated the frequent instability of the Third
Republic. The weaknesses supposedly inherent in democratic governments
were particularly amplified by the circumstances surrounding the Third
Republic's establishment. The Third Republic was not founded on any
momentous popular movement by the French people, but rather it was
engendered by the inability of conservative, monarchist politicians to
determine which royal house should rule France. The government survived
and eventually most Frenchmen came to favor the parliamentary system of a
republican government. Conversely, the French Army became increasingly
hierarchical and anti -democratic in political and social perspective.
This divergence was in many ways the strength of the Third Republic, but
it was also the dominating factor in the numerous controversies that
gripped French society from 1870 to 1914. These controversies were so
intense and profound that their effect on the Army and, in particular,
the officer corps were incalculable.
French society, its government and military establishment, though
often at odds with each other, united in one commanding way--an intense
fear and loathing of the newly created German Empire. Bismarck created
the Second Reich at great expense to all Frenchmen. In addition to
7losing territories and the imposition of a large war indemnity, France
suffered the loss of her self-esteem and dignity. Cries for la Revanche
echoed through the halls of the National Assembly and villages of France
for more than forty years. It was the one factor that could and did
unite France.
Perhaps army officers were more keenly aware of and sensitive to the
full implications of la. Re.va.nckz than their civilian counterparts in the
Third Republic. French officers were very conscious of the military
blunders that led to national disgrace in 1870-1871. Their professional
lives were oriented toward the day of reckoning with the German Army and
their institutions reflected this intense force. The national desire for
la. Rzvanzkz provided the impetus for many of the institutional changes
in the military structure in the years prior to World War I. However,
for the professional officer, la Rzvanckz was not only a goal, but a
personal reminder of the shame of defeat in 1870.
Many members of General Valentin's generation vividly recalled
defeat in the Franco-Prussian War and the myriad of difficulties follow-
ing it. Many were directly or indirectly involved in the political-
military debates of the Third Republic and the various scandals that
will be discussed in following chapters. In the forty-four years between
the Franco-Prussian War and World War I, these damaging events factored
into the mentality of this generation of frontline commanders. However,
at the foundation of this generation's philosophy of training, military
education, and strategy was the goal of la Rzvanckz. General Valentin
emotionally recorded in his 1918 war diary the moment when the realiza-
tion of this goal was at hand.
8We move forward to the shores of the Rhine, so our
horses can drink in that river—which the Germans
wanted to completely monopolize for themselves—
and now it's our turn to 'Mont2A la Gcuidz' on the
shore. We have your German Rhine! It is in our
glass now!
!*
22 November 1918
NOTE: The phrase "It is in our glass now" is curious. Apparently
this was Gen. Valentin's parody of a popular German beer drinking tune
around the turn of the century.—gms
CHAPTER I
Heritage of the French Army
1789-1870
The military corps is the most
complete expression of the spirit
of society
Charles de Gaulle, 1934
The Army of the Third Republic inherited three traditions from its
imperial predecessors: philosophical subordination of the military to
constituted authority, advocacy of conscription, and social and political
achievement through military service. These traditions were at the core
of many of the passionate and emotional controversies between the Army
and the State, between the soldier and the politician. At times these
distinctive traits appeared to contradict and oppose the republican
ideology of the Third Republic. This resulted primarily from the manner
in which preceding governments interpreted the relationship between the
Army as an institution of France and the government as an agent of the
State. In the post Franco-Prussian War period, the construction of this
relationship continued to undergo revision as one government replaced
another and changes in the popular appeal of the Army occurred.
The tradition of active and passive obedience to supreme authority
originated and developed as a result of the metamorphosis of governments
in the years before 1870. These governments encompassed a variety of
9
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political perspectives, which included the revolutionary dictatorship of
the Directory, the imperial rule of Napoleon I, the constitutional
monarchy of Louis-Philippe, the short lived Second Republic, and finally
the imperial reign of Napoleon III.
Prior to 1870, every soldier bound himself to military service by
swearing an oath of personal allegiance to the sovereign. This oath was
the remnant of the feudal compact between lord and vassal. The majority
of officers and men committed not only their faithful service, but
personal, sacred honor as well. Problems arose for the professional
officer as to how far he was bound by his oath when his sovereign was
deposed and replaced by another. This had taken place with great
frequency during the years between 1789 and 1870. Under these circum-
stances where the nation periodically repudiated the sovereign, whom the
soldiers had sworn to serve, a new concept of military loyalty and
ethical structure had to be created.
After the fall of Napoleon, the Bourbon dynasty was restored to the
throne of France in the person of Louis XVIII. The royal government
could never be absolutely certain of the sentiments of the officer
corps, particularly when it considered their behavior during the
Napoleonic "Hundred Days." The army included many Napoleonic veterans,
but also members of the old privileged classes, many of them emigres.
The royal government reserved the most important positions for former
emigre's hoping to ensure the loyalty and devotion of the Army. During
the declining years of the reign of Charles X, the officer corps and
republican activists grew impatient because they suffered demoralization
from the arbitrary, politically motivated policies favoring the royal
government. In 1830, the revolutionary movement that installed the
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constitutional monarchy of Louis-Philippe provided the evolutionary
impetus to redefine the relationship between the soldier and his politi-
cal superior. Two important legislative instruments were devised to
protect the individual officer from capricious and peremptory govern-
mental acts that were strictly politically motivated and to secure the
3
cohesive, undivided fealty of the officer corps.
The Promotion Law of 1832 protected the professional status of
officers by guaranteeing the officers' rights to promotion by strict
seniority up to the grade of commandant (major). The law contained
provisions for the rapid advancement of a small percentage of gifted,
young officers through the echelons of command and general staff
hierarchy. More importantly, the Law of 1834 stipulated that an offi-
cer's rank was his property. It could not be revoked or suspended unless
exceptional circumstances warranted such action. However, an officer's
position and assignment were another matter. The government retained
the prerogative to move and change an officer's billet and assignment
arbitrarily at its convenience. These legal measures and the point of
view they reflected toward the military meant the abstract, philosophi-
cal concept of the state was replacing the more personal idea of the
sovereign as the focal point for military loyalties. The state emerged
as the guarantor of the officer's position in society. As years passed
and governments came and then departed, this concept entrenched itself
4
in the officer corps and legal institutions of France. The net result
of this evolutionary process was the institution of the ideal of passive
obedience to orders from superiors. Military honor and loyalty was no
longer based on personal allegiance but to absolute obedience to whom-
ever held the mandate of legitimate authority.
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One of the most emotional and politically sensitive issues that
strained the relationship between the Army and the State was the con-
cept of universal military conscription. This was not a new issue for
the politicians and soldiers of the late nineteenth century. For the
Third Republic, however, the debate took on a more passionate tone
because of the clash between republican sentiments and military author-
itarianism. This explosive subject emerged from the Great Revolution in
1789 and the subsequent wars to protect the infant republic.
The radicals who came to power as the Committee of Public Safety
indoctrinated the French people with their Jacobin concept of a "Nation
5 . .
in Arms." In August, 1793 the Committee, through its War Minister,
Lazare Carnot, decreed a Itviz en Mo64e for all male citizens of France.
This summons to the manhood of France was a relatively novel idea
because military forces had previously composed of long term professionals
and mercenaries. The "Nation in Arms" concept later justified and set the
precedent for universal military conscription, which would significantly
influence the relationship between the Army and the State over the next
120 years.
Initially, compulsive military service was not entirely successful.
In 1789 the Army enrolled only 25 per cent of the total eligible man-
power due to determined resistance of the peasantry. Napoleon improved
the induction "percentage" during his administration. He increased the
rate of enrollment from 67 per cent to 90 per cent. By 1830, French
society accepted universal military service as a vital element in the
national life of France. The French people neither enthusiastically
embraced conscription nor, likewise, wholeheartedly abhorred it. The
controversies and political debates in the Third Republic centered on
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the technical aspects of conscription such as length of service, unit
assignments, and post-separation status. Military service, itself, was
regarded as necessary to the security of France.
Conscription was revolutionary in its own right. It changed the
military establishment by completely reorienting the Army in French
society. The Army of the Revolutionary era was no longer considered by
the people as the praetorian guard of kings, but rather as the armed
organ of democratic government and protector of the citizenry of France.
Thousands of citizen-soldiers entered the Army and swelled the ranks to
unprecedented proportions. Imbued with revolutionary zeal, French
soldiers waged successful campaigns against counter-revolutionary
forces and altered the map of Europe. The military order was also
changed because of the idea of a "Nation in Arms." Serving in the Army
was now an expression of patriotism since, it was believed, the Army
represented the Republic instead of an aristocracy. Patriotism, a
serious matter for most Frenchmen, ran particularly deep among common
citizens because of the new republican belief that linked military
service to democratic virtues. Patriotism permeated its military
complement "esprit de corps" and rose to become an ideal. The patriotic
fervor not only made the Army popular, but also made its officer corps
parochical. Army officers regarded themselves as the embodiment of the
patriotic ideal, standing above politics and partisan intrigue. This
self-image paralleled the evolving definition of the relationship among
the professional officer corps, the Army as a whole, and the State. The
professional officer corps considered itself a separate entity dedicated
to the preservation of the French nation, society, and culture. French
officers believed they were the ultimate protectors of France. This
14
conviction led professional officers to avoid politics early in their
relationship with the state.
Between Waterloo (1815) and the July Monarchy (1830), the Army
g
experienced a decline in popular appeal and image. The Restoration of
the Bourbon dynasty in 1815 alienated the Army from the French people
because it was tied to Louis XVIII (1815-1824) who did not appeal to the
nationalism of the common Frenchman. He had been installed on his
throne by the military enemies of Napoleon I. Consisting of a large
number of aristocrats and emigres, the Army was considered by common
citizens to be associated with the foreign powers responsible for the
Restoration.
There were other reasons for this slump in military appeal. The
people of France were still weary from the unceasing martial clamor of
the Napoleonic era. In addition, there were several unpleasant but real
drawbacks associated with military life. The pay of an officer was very
low and prospects for promotion were not encouraging. The routine of
regimental life restricted an officer's opportunity to marry and limited
his social affiliations. Regiments rotated garrisons on the average of
every eighteen months, adding to the difficulties in an officer's social
life. Private soldiers were recruited from those too poor to escape
induction. Conscription was regulated by lottery. Candidates who drew
"safe" numbers were exempt from obligation. Others who drew designated
numbers for induction could still avoid service by locating a substitute.
They were found among the poor through the use of a financial incentive.
Extraordinary measures were used to evade military service by the
unwilling sons of wealthy families. Companies were established to
ensure young, well-to-do Frenchmen against an unfortunate drawing and to
15
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furnish substitutes for those who did. For those who were inducted, a
term of service lasting seven or eight years awaited them. Under these
circumstances the Army offered unattractive prospects to most young
Frenchmen.
During the reign of Louis-Philippe (1830-1848), the Army regained
some of its former glory and prestige because of its successful military
occupation and administration of Algeria. Politically, however, it was
considered a hotbed of liberalism with a potential for revolutionary
activity. The violence and political insecurity associated with the
Revolution of 1830 and the July Monarchy were vivid memories to
suspicious politicians. Many welcomed colonial excursions as an outlet
for Army activities. With the Regular Army so employed, the National
Guard inherited the responsibility to maintain public order. The
National Guard consisted of citizens from the bourgeois class, who had
been responsible for the revitalization of republican government in the
1830' s. The Regular Army reserved the mission of defending France on
her frontiers and administering colonies.
In 1848 France endured another revolution. Louis Napoleon
Bonaparte assumed the reins of power in the midst of political turbulence
and instability. This year marks a turning point in the French Army,
which experienced a transformation of its political and social orienta-
tion. Widespread revolutionary violence had erupted in response to a
general feeling of disaffection with the government of Louis-Philippe.
The National Guard, now an unreliable force, was called out, but was
unable to cope with the crisis. In its place, the Regular Army was
summoned to restore order. Bourgeois citizens, who had neglected their
obligations in the National Guard, had little choice but to allow
16
professional soldiers to cope with the chaotic situation. The govern-
ment called upon General Louis Cavaignac to save the Republic.
A professional soldier with strong Republican inclinations, General
Cavaignac had spent most of the years preceding the 1848 Revolution in
Algeria. He returned to France in 1848 to become the Minister of War
and to prepare military defenses in Paris. During the 1848 rebellion he
was given dictatorial powers. General Cavaignac crushed the insurrection
and a grateful government named him the "savior of society."
The use of the Army in civil disturbances in 1848 and again in 1851
had two important effects on the Army as an institution. First, the
Army became identified with reactionary politics and governmental estab-
lishment. The Army aided Louis Napoleon in destroying parliamentary
government in 1851 by a coup d'etat. Under Napoleon III, military forces
were increasingly employed to break workers' strikes and for political
repression. During his reign Napoleon III (1851-1871) enhanced the
prestige of the Army for their role in saving France from civil war; and,
eventually, it became the pillar of his autocratic regime. In order to
reinforce the clout of the Army in domestic matters, Napoleon III unified
the command of the regular Army and National Guard. In the Second Empire,
all soldiers whether regular army or National Guard, were placed under
one military system where officers were no longer elected as they
previously had been in the National Guard. This was a significant step
in the evolving separatism of professional officers within the state.
Second, the Army continued to be a refuge for members of the
aristocracy who had been denied political office over the last forty
years. They were attracted to the Army in hopes of reclaiming their
traditional eminence in the only profession left open to them for
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achieving influence and recognition. The other government institutions,
such as the Civil Service, were becoming increasingly more Republican in
political tone and dominated by men appointed by liberal factions. These
two incipient factors—the association with reactionary policy and the
officer corps' parochialism—would mature into institutional character-
istics in the last half of the nineteenth century.
Public concern compelled the Army to re-direct its attention from
maintenance of domestic order to international involvement with the out-
break of a series of nationalistic wars in the 1850's. In 1854, French
military forces were dispatched to the Crimean Peninsula to join their
allies in combating the Russian enemy and in 1859 aided Piedmont's
attempt at independence from the Austrian Emperor Franz-Josef. In 1866,
alert Frenchmen, both military and civilian, observed the devastating
power of Bismarck's Prussian Army in his war against Austria. The
dramatic defeat of the Austrian forces by the "New Model" Prussian Army
at Sadowa (1866) alarmed many French citizens. Military officials began
to prepare for the clash between France and her emerging continental
rival
.
France in the nineteenth century was an artistic, intellectual, and
agricultural country, but it was also on occasion a militaristic one.
In 1848 it elected a poet as president in time of revolutionary crisis
and in 1870 it chose an historian to rescue it from the Prussians, but
it turned to military leaders more often in times of political turmoil.
The army as an institution generally avoided direct political involvement
with the exception of the coup d'etat in 1851. However, this did not
preclude certain gifted officers from using their military position to
advance their political ambitions by exploiting unusual opportunities.
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The tradition of Napoleon as the soldier who could save France was
continued by General Cavaignac in 1848, Marshal MacMahon in 1873, and
General Boul anger in 1888. In each instance, military governments
were not established; rather, civilian authority was maintained. This is
important in that professional officers, either willingly or not,
accepted the neutral role of the military in politics.
On the eve of the Franco-Prussian war, the French Army occupied a
prominent position in the State, within society, and enjoyed the respect
of the international military community. The Army symbolized loyalty,
service, and patriotism even though it had discarded its Republican
origins to become the mainstay of dictatorial power under Napoleon III.
Its political orientation was decidedly conservative, if not monarchist,
but it could claim the military heritage of the First Empire as the
descendants of Revolutionary and Napoleonic soldiers who had conquered
Europe and had enjoyed the glory of imperial France. The French Army
entered 1870 an arrogantly confident military organization supposedly
ready to protect the interests of the government and safeguard the
French nation.
NOTE: Though it exceeds the scope of the present work, it is
interesting to note that Marshal Pe*tain, General de Gaulle, and General
Sal an adopted the "man on horseback" role in more recent examples.—gms
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CHAPTER II
The Franco-Prussian War :
The Seeds of la. Rzvanchz
To arms! To arms! Ye brave!
The avenging sword unsheathe,
March on! March on! all hearts
resolved
On victory or death!
The Marseillaise, Rouget de Lisle 1792
In 1870, Spanish military leaders offered the crown of their country
to a Prussian aristocrat—Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen--to
fill the vacancy left by the deposition of Queen Isabella. The French
were furious at this bold attempt by Prince von Bismarck to install a
Prussian officer as the King of Spain. Their concerns were not without
foundation. The Chancellor of the North German Confederation intended
to surround France with his political allies. This was an excellent
opportunity to ensure a friendly power on the southern border of France.
When the French government protested vigorously the candidacy of the
Prussian prince, the Prussians at first appeared to back down. However,
Bismarck pressed the issue, having as his real ambition the unification
of North and South Germany. By the use of clever propaganda and
diplomatic intrigue, Bismarck maneuvered France into war as the aggres-
sor, a role the French readily accepted.
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There are few events in the history of modern France that had such
disastrous consequences on the French people, their political institu-
tions, and military establishment as did the Franco-Prussian War. With
the cataclysmic events of 1870-1871, a new era began in France. The next
four decades were filled with governmental instability, clashes between
secularism and clericalism in education, social discontent, and economic
pressures. French officers of the World War I generation were profoundly
affected by the climate of uncertainty created by the interplay of these
forces. At the core, indeed the cause, of many of the controversies
facing the Army was the bitter memory of its capitulation in 1870. For
this reason, it is necessary to review significant features of the
Franco-Prussian War's effect on the French military.
Prior to the war, the French Army was reputed to be the best in
Europe, despite the Prussian victory at Sadowa in 1866. French officers
showed courage and took their profession seriously. Unfortunately,
courage and dedication were not enough. There lacked the proper amount
of attention to the comfort and conditions of the rank and file of the
private soldier. Instead, most officers concerned themselves with
computing future promotions and their accompanying proprietary titles.
It appeared that, for the majority of officers, reviewing the Army List
was their only intellectual pursuit.
There were exceptions of course. The artillery and engineer offi-
cers who were educated at the Ecole Polytechnique showed the highest
intellectual merit. But those officers were technicians and designers
who, for the most part, did not possess an understanding of the general
problems of war. The General Staff was comprised mostly of officers
from the Staff Corps and as such had never served in a regiment. These
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officers were unprepared to organize and plan large scale mobilization,
2
transportation, service support operations.
French senior commanders had, on the whole, more practical military
experience than their Prussian counterparts who participated in theoreti-
cal training. However, French officers who distinguished themselves in
Africa and Mexico had only commanded small mobile columns. They were
promoted without having commanded large troop formations and, consequently
without having experienced the problems associated with mobilization.
Thus their officer's commission and command potential could be validated
only by personal valor and direct combat performance.
The Crimean and Italian campaigns did not alter this practice nor
lead to innovations in officer education and training. Officers still
believed that e*lan and battlefield gallantry would be the most important
ingredients in a quick victory over the Prussians. The French army took
to the field ready "down to their gaiter buttons," so they thought,
confident of victory and enjoying tremendous public support.
From the onset of the Franco-Prussian War, French military forces
encountered severe problems. Due to insufficient planning, transporta-
tion had to be improvised, ammunition was scarce, and units were not
brought up to authorized strengths during mobilization. Because no unit
larger than a regiment existed in peace time, divisions and army corps
had to be formed from regimental sized units from all over France. This
caused enormous problems in concentrating the main French field armies.
This was due to the inefficiency and inexperience of the French general
staff. As J. F. C. Fuller noted, the General Staff "was a collection of
young-bloods out of touch with the army and elderly clerks overwhelmed
with the minutiae of routine." Such was the condition of the General
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Staff that Marshal Bazaine at Sedan, like other senior commanders,
forbade its officers on the battlefield. Rather, they relied on their
personal and subordinate staffs for assistance and information. Added to
these problems in the mobilization process was the lack of a well
coordinated plan of campaign to initiate operations. The only "plan"
French commanders in the field possessed was a desire to invade southern
Germany and then march "On to Berlin."
The French Army was hampered still further by Napoleon Ill's deci-
sion to take personal command in the field. The situation was made even
more difficult by the absence of a unified or centralized planning staff
and a single commander-in-chief.
The French campaign began in August 1870 with a general advance in
Alsace-Lorraine. After minor, indecisive defeats at Weissenburg,
Froschuidler, and Spichern, the French army never ceased retreating.
The military situation rapidly deteriorated. Finally, one-half of the
army under General Bazaine was gathered into Metz and the other half
commanded by Marshal MacMahon and accompanied by Napoleon was herded
4
into Sedan.
At Sedan, General Ducrot, who had replaced the wounded Marshal
MacMahon, found his army surrounded by Moltke. He desperately attempted
to break out, but all efforts failed. He was replaced by General
Wimpffen, who urged the Emperor to place himself at the front of the army
and make one last attempt. Rejecting the proposal, Napoleon decided to
surrender himself to the King of Prussia and avoid the sacrifice of more
French soldiers. General Wimpffen surrendered his besieged army on
1 September 1870—only forty-six days after the declaration of war.
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The war appeared to be over. Half of the French forces in the field
had surrendered at Sedan, the other half were encircled at Metz. While
German armies continued to besiege Metz, the Second Empire fell. On 4
September a provisional government was formed by Leon Gambetta after
escaping to Tours by balloon, and resistance resumed. The French nation
responded to his call for a "Nation in Arms." Renewed opposition
appeared to the Prussian invasion. Particularly effective were small
units that harassed and interdicted the Prussians' lines of communica-
tion. In spite of these valiant efforts, the besieged garrison at Metz
capitulated in October 1870. Amidst rumors of treason and collaboration,
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General Bazaine surrendered his army of 173,000 effectives. Serious
French resistance continued over the next three months, but did not
affect the outcome of the war. In January 1871, the Convention of
Versailles ended hostilities between France and the newly created German
Empire. The capitulation of French forces became a national disgrace.
The causes of the ignominious defeat of the French Army are varied
and numerous. Two main reasons were organizational deficiencies at the
national level and disunity of command. The French Army had no estab-
lished war plans on which to initiate tactical operations or to base
logistical requirements. Prussian strategy was conceived and practiced
in advance by the use of numerous war games using units actually
designated for deployment. In contrast no unit in the French Army above
the regiment existed in peacetime. Therefore, brigades, divisions, army
corps, and armies had to be created and gathered from all over France at
the time of mobilization. Without pre-determined assembly areas, staging
areas, pre-stocked logistical stores, or transportation priorities, the
French Army suffered a severe disadvantage.
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In the French Army, nothing existed comparable to the Prussian
General Staff. It did not possess a single, centralized organ with a
peacetime mission of preparing France for war. The Ministry of War was
responsible for the administration of the army. It was divided into
functional departments or "bureaus" which supervised the specific func-
tions of pay, commissary, and procurement for each branch of service-
infantry, cavalry, and artillery. These departments were staffed by
civilians, often including the director; and they operated in a
bureaucratic vacuum from each other and from units in the field.
In addition to these formidable impediments, the French Army in the
field had no commander-in-chief who possessed absolute authority over
subordinates. The main French Army changed commanders three times in
Q
six weeks. Subordinates displayed little initiative and engaged in
personal feuds and bickered incessantly among each other. Not even
Napoleon III could instill a sense of cooperation among his generals.
This lack of direction in the conduct of the war extended to the govern-
ment in Paris as well. While Napoleon III took to the field, the Empress
and a Regency Council directed the war effort incompetently, contributing
to the completeness of the disaster.
The war was formally ended by the Treaty of Frankfurt in May 1871.
France reluctantly agreed to cede the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine
and to pay an indemnity of 5 billion francs; a German army of occupation
was to be stationed in France until the settlement of the debt. The
material losses were harsh, but the national humiliation and indignity
were even more unbearable for the defeated but proud French. The people
of France could not forget that just six months earlier, France had been
the leading power of Europe and the cultural center of the Western world.
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Suddenly, all that was gone. France, dismembered, in debt, and occupied,
drifted toward inevitable political and governmental crisis.
The terrible and humiliating calamity was most fervently remembered
by its soldiers. Down through the years, soldiers, such as J. B.
Valentin, considered themselves the warrior race of Europe, and they
g
could not forget this degradation. In the forty years between the
Franco-Prussian War and World War I, the desire to exonerate the French
Army became the first article of faith for professional officers. This
compulsion for revenge, or Rzvanckz, was manifest in almost every
military endeavor—training, education, and strategic planning. These
will be discussed in more detail in following chapters. Rzvanche,
affected more than mere impersonal institutions. It was something
personal, profound, and ever present for the officers of General
Valentin's generation. Forty-five years after the event, the defeat of
1870 was alive in the thoughts and hearts of this generation. J. B.
Valentin was probably like other senior commanders when he reminded the
troops of the 27th Infantry Regiment of their duty when war came in
1914.
My friends, while going to the front, keep in
mind all the cruelties committed by our enemies
on our women, children, and InoMenbili.
Remember the harsh peace terms imposed on
France by Germany forty-four years ago. The
theft of our dear provinces Alsace-Lorraine
and the innumerable humiliations inflicted
on our country since then. Remember it!
Remember it!!
13 August 1914
Part of the concept of la Ke.va.nc.kz was the idea that past French
victories would be an inspiration to success. For an Army recovering
from defeat, this would contribute to morale and to the preparation of
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troops for battle. General Valentin relied on this theme when he con-
tinued his order to the 27th Infantry Regiment.
. . . remember also that a little more than a
century ago our forefathers felled the German
pride in circumstances similar to that of today.
First in Valmy (1792) where our just formed
militia forced the Prussians back while shouting
"Viva la Nation," then in Jena and Auerstadt
(1806) where in only one day the Prussian Army
was crushed, destroyed, and scattered. One
month later all of Germany belonged to us and
begged for mercy. . . .
13 August 1914
These extracts are from General Valentin's Order Number 2. They
illustrate his preoccupation with the German Army. The glorious
military past of France made even more keen the desire to avenge the
defeat of 1870-1871. Valentin reminded his men that France had defeated
Germany in the past and implied that she would do so again. The disgrace
that France had suffered at the hands of Germany in the preceding forty-
four years loomed large in his words, echoes of the military defeat of
France in 1870 in the Franco-Prussian War.
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CHAPTER III
The Army in the Third Republic :
1871-1914
A monarchy is a merchantman which sails well, but will some-
times strike on a rock, and go to the bottom; a republic is
a raft which will never sink, but then your feet are always
in water.
Fisher Ames, 1795
The distinguished New England Federalist aptly described the dif-
ficulty in sustaining a republican government. The political adminis-
trations of the Third Republic testified almost continuously to Ames'
subtle observation. The Third Republic experienced rotation of govern-
ments, attempted coups, scandals, and national demoralization. The
French Army, as a major institution in the Third Republic, could not
avoid being significantly influenced by major socio-political events
during this period. Professional officers, as the leaders of the Army,
were sensitive to the issues and controversies facing the army and the
nation. Officers were themselves the most serious and constant critics
of the Army in its reorganization and its reformation. Their observa-
tions provided the basis for the unending political debates about the
Army in the Third Republic.
The Army was the one institution above all others that could claim
2
the energy, courage, and wealth of the defeated and humiliated nation.
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This may seem incongruous in light of the army's performance during the
recent war. Nonetheless, in the twenty-five years following the Franco-
Prussian War, as David Ralston has written "The army occupied an honored
place in the affection of practically every Frenchman." The reason for
this phenomenon was that, in a France conquered, humiliated, and divided,
the army became the great "common denominator" for all Frenchmen. The
war had given the opportunity to thousands upon thousands of young men to
serve France and to acquaint themselves with military life. Millions of
citizens had come into direct or indirect contact with the Army, who
otherwise would not have. The swell of patriotic fervor showed more than
just an increase of familiarity with the military service. The dispos-
session of the two French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine "touched a
vital nerve," and the Army was perceived as the instrument to regain
3
them.
The infant Third Republic encountered its first post-war crisis six
months after its establishment. The Provisional Government fled Paris
during the war to avoid capture by the Prussians. The capital was left
under the control of mayoral committees, who exercised authority over the
city's National Guard units. The vacuum left behind by the Provisional
Government's departure was readily filled by leftist politicians in the
mayoral committees. There was a long history of deep resentment and
suspicion between Parisians and the rest of the country. Since the
revolution in 1789, Paris had been identified with advanced republican
ideals, while the provinces were politically more conservative. The
pressures of the German siege and the decision of the National Assembly
to cancel the moratorium on wartime commercial debts made Paris a center
of revolutionary fervor. In March 1871, Parisians elected an autonomous
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municipal council which was determined to pursue the war and preserve the
Republic. This autonomous municipality, called the Paris Commune, was a
direct challenge to the authority of the Provisional Government, and an
immediate and serious crisis ensued.
The Provisional Government of the venerable historian Adolphe Thiers
reacted by authorizing Marshal Marie-Maurice MacMahon to occupy Paris and
reinstate the government. The Army had few remaining reliable troops;
the exceptions were the French Foreign Legion and Algerian native
soldiers. The Army, enervated by the disastrous war, was not in a
"combative mood." They particularly disliked the prospects of fighting
their Parisian countrymen. To marshal a suitable force, Thiers asked
Bismarck to accelerate the repatriation of the prisoners of war of the
old Imperial Army captured at Sedan and Metz. These professional
soldiers were reliable and loyal to orders from government officials and
when repatriated were organized as the Army of Versailles.
In early April, the Army of Versailles began its offensive by
attacking and seizing suburbs around the capital. Paris was ablaze with
the emotional fervor of civil war. The French Army marched on Paris to
force its way into the city. This was a particularly agonizing venture
for the professional army officer and his troops. To entertain the
German Army of Occupation by treating them to a brutal civil war added
insult to the intense disgrace of the recently defeated French Army.
Nevertheless, the French infantry entered Paris with the aid of an
artillery bombardment, and the savagery of street fighting began.
The Paris Commune, as a military force, collapsed. The fighting
during the "Bloody Week" was conducted by stalwart individuals behind
barricades. Reprisals were severe. The army disposed of the rebels and
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sympathizers with bitter resolution. Prisoners and collaborators were
summarily judged and executed by firing squad. By the end of May, the
fighting had stopped, and Paris was returned to the Provisional Govern-
ment. The army, under Marshal MacMahon, had restored peace and order to
France. The Paris Commune was important to the Army because it was the
prime reason for its rapid reconstitution, which under other circum-
stances may have taken longer. The success of the Army in smashing the
Commune emphasized the absolute value in possessing a strong, obedient
military force to politicians of the early Third Republic. Nevertheless
the professional officers, who had predominated the officer corps in the
recent war, could take little pride in the victory. For them, fighting a
civil war under the disdainful eyes of the German Army of Occupation must
5
have been a bitter reminder of their degradation.
It would be difficult to gauge which of the two great catastrophes
horrified the French more— the defeat of France by the Prussians or the
shock of civil war and potential for more "Communes." The deputies to
the National Assembly were convinced that France must undergo a moral
and social revitalization in order to rise above this depressing state
and to regain its position in the international community. The disagree-
ment on how this was to be accomplished showed up in the military. For
example, one of the first steps in this process was the reorganization
of the army. All deputies agreed that reorganization was necessary, but
finding a method proved extremely difficult for the politically diverse
deputies. This situation caused much consternation and apprehension for
the army during the period from 1871 to 1914.
The conservative deputies did not immediately address the need to
reform the Army's hierarchy or to investigate the reasons for its
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defeat. Rather they moved to re-establish hierarchical order in the
professional officer corps and to reapply rules that traditionally
governed its existence. During the last days of Gambetta's government,
officers were desperately needed to replace those who had been captured
at Metz and Sedan. To supply them, guidelines enacted by the Promotion
Laws of 1832 and 1834 were suspended for the duration of hostilities.
Officers were commissioned from groups of citizens with known republican
sentiments, and seasoned officers were catapulted several grades higher.
After the war, the officers of the regular army returned to France and
believed their vital interests had been endangered by the rapid expansion
of the officer corps. There was an excess of 50 per cent in the officer
ranks. A government committee was established to evaluate each offi-
cer's source of commission and determine the merits of any promotion.
The results were predictable. Regular army officers were favored over
the officers receiving their commissions from Gambetta's government. As
a result, regular Army officers were reinstated in their former positions
at the expense of the "temporarily" promoted officers. Thus the officer
corps in the Third Republic had much the same composition as it had in
the Second Empire under Napoleon III. The result of the government's
committee was that officers in command of the Army for the next three
decades would have begun their careers in the Second Empire or before.
This secured for the Army a body of officers who would perpetuate tradi-
tional military values and firmly establish the goal of RevancAe.
Marshal MacMahon became President of the Third Republic in 1873.
Marie-Maurice MacMahon was considered the only person in France able to
head the government because of his untainted role in the Franco-Prussian
War and his service to the Republic in the Paris Commune uprising. The
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founders of the Third Republic intended for it to be only temporary,
while they debated which royal house would furnish a new king for the
Third Restoration. This issue was passionately debated among competing
monarchist deputies—Legitimists, Orleanists, and Bonapartists. There
were two favored candidates—the Comte de Chambord representing the
Bourbon line and the Comte de Paris, heir to the House of Orleans. The
Army did not become directly involved in the controversy, but it was
affected by its outcome. The two rival factions were so inflexible and
uncompromising that they threw away any hopes of a Restoration. Marshal
MacMahon continued in the presidency until 1879 under a republican
constitution promulgated in 1875.
The failure of monarchist politicians to re-establish a monarchy
had significant ramifications in the relationship between the Army and
the State. Professional officers now served in a republic governed by
politicians of many different factions and parties, who represented a
wide variety of ideas on the subject of civil -military relations. They
also must work within a democratic framework that often was unresponsive
to the concerns of the military chiefs and in which, on occasion, the
politicians chose to follow their own advice in the formulation of
military policy.
Army officers encountered a confusing and paradoxical political
environment in the Third Republic. In the relationship between the Army
and the State, the officer worked for and with politicians who as
republicans, socialists, conservatives, anti -militarists, rightists, and
leftists represented diverse and sometimes overlapping factions. Because
of the confusing nature of French politics, it is necessary to offer some
general definitions of political terms. Republicans basically believed
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that the republic should defend the individual against the state, while
recognizing that citizens had to work within the limits of the social
order. Radical politicians labored for the complete separation of church
and state and for the political treatment of social problems. They felt
also that governments in general possessed an inherent inclination
towards tyranny. The individual had the right and responsibility to keep
this tendency in check. The political Right included politicians who
desired to maintain the status quo or even bring back the "good old
days," government hierarchy, and the infallibility of the Catholic Church.
Members of the Left believed that all men were created equal, progression
of man through reason, and men have the right to individual pursuits
without undue interference from government. In the Third Republic the
main advocates of pacifism and anti -militarism were the Socialists. They
maintained that the army was only a tool which capitalists used to keep
the proletariat under their control. No war was worth fighting since it
g
would only increase the suffering of the masses. Encompassing these
factions was the main branch of the Republican Party. The Moderates or
Opportunists maintained that though one should be bold in one's ideas, he
should be prudent in executing them.
The confusing nature of French politics created a climate of mis-
trust and enlarged the distance between the politician and the separate
professionalism of the officer corps. As later writings of General
Valentin suggest, officers gained a contempt for the socialists as
irresponsible enemies of the military. This sentiment lingered for
years and showed itself even on the eve of demobilization in 1918:
It's not time to demobilize yet. L<u> BcchzA
have not demobilized. And already our extreme
Left, our "good" Socialists are asking that the
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whole French Army and its soldiers be returned
to their homes. And once more the Socialists
make it an election issue. Those people are
only rascals pursuing their own interests. They
always flatter the electorate by giving them
what they want. They care nothing for France
or its welfare. I hope the Socialists are
rejected and discredited by the electorate.
23 November 1918
These selections from General Valentin's diary show his distaste for
socialists and their anti -militarism, but they may also indicate a feel-
ing of disgust with politicians in general during this period. He
suggested such a view upon receiving news that a regiment had hesitated
to advance to the battlefront in World War I.
... It is not the fault of the poilu. It is
the way of governing France; politics permeated
everywhere; more in the south of France than in
the north and with the same undiscipline, corrup-
tion, cowardice, etc. . . .
20 August 1914
Three important reform laws were enacted during the early days of
the Third Republic which provided the essential evolutionary framework
in the development of the relationship between army and state over the
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next forty years. In 1872 the first of these, the Conscription Law, was
passed after much debate. Legislative argument centered around the issue
of the term of service for inductees. The conservative factions wanted a
term of service for seven years; the more liberal deputies wanted it
shorter. From a military viewpoint it was an issue of quality opposed to
quantity. The French Army, made up of long-term professionals, empha-
sized quality while the Prussians with their large reservoir of conscripts
and reserves had only quantity. The professional officers wanted to
retain the "quality" because they believed it took years to make a
soldier proficient and reliable. A compromise was reached that stipulated
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that the term of service would be five years. Basically a conservative
measure, the law did contain one reform— the abolition of substitution.
The sons of rich or influential men could no longer escape conscription,
except through educational exemptions. This law also contained specifi-
cations disenfranchising soldiers from voting until they retired.
The second pertinent law was passed in 1873, and, unlike the
Conscription Law, it was actually a reform. The Reorganization of the
Army Law provided the peacetime army with a wartime organization and
command structure. The Army was given the means to transfer effectively
the responsibility for administration and command from peacetime to
general mobilization for war. Brigades, divisions, and corps were
organized and furnished the appropriate command structure with auxiliary
10
services.
The third piece of legislation concerned the number of cadres and
effectives. Passed in 1875, this stipulated the size of battalions and
companies as well as the appropriate officer's billets. The military
objected to this bill because it addressed a purely technical internal
matter. Prior to 1870, the French infantry regiment consisted of four
battalions, each with six companies. The deputies wanted to change the
regiment so that it would have three battalions, with four companies
each. The purpose of the proposed changes was not to reduce the number
of effectives but to increase tactical potency of a company by making it
larger. Units would still have the same number of men, but would have
fewer officers, particularly captains. In order for republican politi-
cians to placate politically powerful generals sitting in the Senate, a
compromise was reached. Metropolitan regiments would have twelve
companies as the bill stipulated, but Algerian regiments would have four
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battalions and twenty-four companies. Not only were the number of
captains' billets retained, but more billets for majors were created.
The initial legislation dealt with what has often been an endemic
problem area for legislators and soldiers alike. The great question for
military reformers was how far the French Army should go in remodeling,
itself after the Prussian military establishment? Members of the Chamber
of Deputies and Senate, increasingly republican in political perspective,
were very sensitive and suspicious about the ultimate form of the
reorganized military establishment. They knew that the Prussian military
aristocracy dominated the German Empire, that it was anti -democratic,
and that the German General Staff was semi -independent from the German
parliament. This arrangement was anathema to French politicians. Yet,
they were also fully aware that war had entered the industrial age and
that a successful military force required centralized direction and a
sweeping claim on national resources. The terrible memory of Prussia's
victory over French arms was a constant reminder. Even the most liberal
French politicians realized that ultimately their security rested on the
French Army.
The Army, on the other hand, recognized that there could be prob-
lems associated with political involvement and genuinely desired to stay
neutral in political fights except in the legislation affecting its own
internal affairs. It favored the legislation of 1875 barring general
officers from sitting in the Chamber of Deputies. In 1884, general
officers on active duty were barred from holding positions in the Senate
except in the special case of a few distinguished old soldiers. The
military greeted these measures as guarantees against harmful effects on
the Army's tradition of political neutrality. For the most part,
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professional officers believed that to introduce into the army the
factional quarrels of the parliament would destroy its cohesion and
consequently its effectiveness.
In the 1880' s the professional officer corps began to awaken from
its many years of intellectual turpor. In the words of David Ralston,
"Within the officer corps, there could now be sensed a real intellectual
ferment." A few newspapers appeared as well as professional journals,
discussing current military issues. The penetrating posthumous work of
Colonel Ardant du Picq, Etudz* 4ua Lz combat, received international
acclaim, even from the Germans. Colonel Lewal published La Ki^onrnz dz
V arvmzz and acquired an immediate reputation in French military circles.
He was appointed the first commandant of the Ecolz dz Guzkaz and later
served as Minister of War. The next four decades saw the publication of
12
numerous periodicals and books on military subjects.
The military renaissance was further advanced by the introduction of
new weaponry and equipment. The Gras and later the Lebel magazine load-
ing rifle provided infantry units with increased fire-power and flexi-
bility. French artillerymen made significant innovations in breech-
loading field artillery pieces. By 1900, French cannoneers had regained
their premier position among field artillerymen with the introduction of
the 75mm field gun.
One of the most significant events in the French Army's reforms was
the reorganization of its staff system in 1880. The previous staff
system was instituted in 1818 by Saint-Cyr. Staff officers were assigned
only to the Staff Corps and were separated from the rest of the officer
corps who were eligible for field commands. They did not serve with
troops and were assigned only to higher commands. The Staff Corps was
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intended to suppress any favoritism that might accompany positions that
were inherently close to senior commanders. Unfortunately, the French
Army had been completely without the benefit of staff planning and
organization in the war with Prussia. Separation from troop duty
insulated staff officers from a sense of the realities of the modern
battlefield. The new staff system sought to correct this. Officers
could only be admitted to staff service after graduating from the Ecolz
dz Guzaaz. Candidates could enter the tzolz dz Guzaaz after serving a
number of years with troop units. Assignments to positions on division
and corps staff would alternate with duty at the troop level.
Officers who demonstrated exceptional talent were selected for the
developing General Staff. In 1887, the General Staff of the Minister of
War reached its final form and was chartered along the same lines as the
Prussian model. It comprised a ministerial portfolio and four bureaus-
personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics. But, it had one
significant disadvantage. The Minister of War was a general on active
duty, but he was also a member of the cabinet. If the government lost a
vote of confidence, as it often did in the Third Republic, it was forced
to resign— in its entirety in accordance with the principle of ministe-
rial solidarity. The Minister of War, though selected for his military
experience and expertise, was nonetheless obliged to resign along with
his ministerial colleagues.
As a result of this practice, there were twenty-six Ministers of War
from 1875 to 1900. The frequent change in ministers affected the Army in
two very important ways. First, it made it difficult, if not impossible,
for policy at the cabinet level to have continuity and stability. The
exception was Charles Freycinet, a civilian who served as minister from
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1888 to 1893. His tenure was the longest and generally considered the
most successful, especially in reform of the General Staff. Second, less
competent generals usually held the portfolio. The more capable officers
desired to remain in corps and division command billets to avoid merely
temporary service in the ministry. The most prominent generals did not
consider appointment to the War Ministry as the climax to a successful
career.
The most capable generals wanted to stay in the purely military
sphere preferring to command a corps or an army in time of war. The
reluctance of qualified officers to serve as Minister of War added to the
weakness in the Army's high command. The ministerial appointment usually
went by default to officers junior to the most prominent generals. In
theory the general who was Minister of War exercised command authority
over the entire army by virtue of his position. He did not possess the
added authority of an increase in rank over his subordinate field com-
manders because the highest rank in the army was that of divisionary
general. Authority for corps and army command derived from the positions
themselves. It was traditional that among officers of equal rank,
precedence went to the one promoted first. Because of this situation,
the Minister of War, as the nominal commander of the French Army, was
often junior to his corps commanders. In practice, the Minister of War
might very well hesitate to exert the full authority of his office over
13
generals commanding in the field.
In the late 1880's, a series of events began that interfered with
and interrupted the army's attempts to continue its reformation and
reorganization. Just when the Army was in a position to advance its
popularity and healthy working relationship with the Assembly, the
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relationship gave way to apathy, estrangement, and at times, hostility
between politicians and soldiers. The problem began in 1886 with the
appointment of the flamboyant General Georges Boulanger as the Minister
of War. The political successes of the conservative and Rightist fac-
tions alarmed the liberal republicans, especially the Radicals of the
political Left. Leftists conspired to have General Boulanger appointed
to the ministry. They were very much concerned about the increasing
trend of political reaction in the military. They wanted to reverse this
general trend of conservatism and, in particular, inject republican
virtues into the military forces. Eventually, political forces allied
with Boulanger coalesced into an undefined, emotional movement usually
referred to as Boulangism.
General Boulanger as the War Minister was energetic and determined
to force Republican reform on the Army. The food, lodging, and clothing
of the troops were improved, and he worked to gain the loyalty of the
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noncommissioned officers. The morale of the Army and regimental esprit
were encouraged and fostered. Unfortunately for the Army, these were
shallow rehabilitative measures designed to promote the political career
of Boulanger. He continued in his efforts to republicanize the Army by
removing officers with aristocratic connections and dismissing general
officers senior to himself. General Boulanger, as a Radical minister,
was the darling of Parisian society and was popular with the masses. His
political image grew in a wave of emotional appeal. He claimed to
represent the Republican tradition that had made France great in her past.
Boulanger denounced the conservative deputies for failing to pursue
a more active policy in war preparation. His appeal for increased
military preparation fired the emotional fervor of the public who still
43
clamored for la Rzvanchz. The government became justifiably concerned
and transferred him to a field command outside Paris. The Radical and
Republican politicians were enraged and the Chamber pressed the President
for his return. To placate Boulanger's numerous supporters, the Presi-
dent gave in. Boulanger returned and was elected to the Chamber and his
political ambitions increased. Boulanger had ceased to be a political
general or an army reformer. He had now become a symbol representing a
great republican national movement and a public idol. Boulanger's
patriotic rhetoric combined with the exposure of scandals involving
family members of high public officials threw the government into tur-
moil. France was rapidly approaching a crisis. The immediate cause was
the resignation of Jules Gre*vy, President of France since 1879, and the
election of a successor. Suitable candidates were difficult to identify
because of the political differences of the factions involved. It was
Georges Clemenceau who found an acceptable man by advising his colleagues
to "Vote for the stupidist." They elected Sidi Carnot. Though not
"stupid," he lacked any real political or administrative talent. The
real victor of the crisis was Boulanger because of the frailty of the
newly elected government.
Republican politicians sensed an opportunity to control the govern-
ment using Boulanger as their standard-bearer. It was planned that
Boulanger would lead his supporters in demanding the dissolution of the
Chamber of Deputies.
At the moment when everything appeared to be in his favor, Boulanger
lost his nerve. The government was aware of the plan to dissolve the
parliament and used the legality of their position to prevent its
execution. They prepared to call the High Court into session to try
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Boulanger for seditious acts. The possibility of his arrest and trial
before the High Court undoubtedly smothered his zeal. He deserted his
baffled supporters and went into a self-imposed exile. His supporters
sent deputations to induce him to return and face a skeptical public. He
refused, not wanting to be separated from his dying mistress. A few
supporters of Boulangism remained but evaporated in 1891 when Boulanger
shot himself in despair over the death of his mistress. Dramatic to the
end, he killed himself on her grave, and Boulangism was buried in a
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Brussels cemetery.
The Army's reaction to Boulanger is both interesting and pertinent
to the relationship between the professional military and the government.
Career officers may not have shown affection for politicians in general,
but they cared far less for one of their own that used his uniform to
advance his political ambitions. Even though Boulanger spoke for the
principles of patriotism and military preparedness, he failed to win
supporters in the professional officer corps. Boulanger never seriously
considered using the Army against the regime because he realized that the
Army would never support such a plan.
The Army satisfied those politicians who had been skeptical over the
loyalty of the army. And equally important, the Boulanger episode
demonstrated the unreliability of political soldiers, raising questions
about the ambivalent status of a Minister of War. This was one of the
prime considerations in the appointment of the first civilian minister,
Charles Freycinet, in 1888.
Over the next fifteen years, the Army experienced more serious
distractions that influenced profoundly its role in the Third Republic.
A series of events, including the Dreyfus Affair in the mid-1890's and
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the Combes and Andre episodes involved the Ministry of War in a scandal
that altered the Army's position in society. Officers of General
Valentin's generation were in mid-career during this period and were
exposed to the far reaching implications of corruption, dishonesty, and
disloyalty of these events.
The Republic had not yet fully recovered from Boulangism when in
late 1894 a Jewish Army captain, Alfred Dreyfus, was arrested for
espionage and treason. It was an event that would eventually involve and
embroil all segments of French society, although the affair was from
beginning to end an Army matter. The legal aspects and circumstances
surrounding the famous courts-martial are well known and need not be
reiterated. Based on circumstantial evidence, an Army tribunal convicted
and sentenced Dreyfus to life imprisonment for complicity in a German
spy ring. The Army would suffer greatly from this blatant mockery of
military justice. It was widely believed that, in this period of govern-
ment corruption and weakness one institution did not falter in its duty.
As D. W. Brogan has written, "There might be no government that the man
on the street could trust, but there was the Army." Unfortunately for
the Army, Dreyfus was innocent, and his conviction set in motion a series
of events that eventually culminated in one of the most extensive scandals
of the century.
The Dreyfus Affair, as it is known to history, reached incredible
proportions and eventually polarized society. The Affair far surpassed
the legal aspects of the Dreyfus court-martial. It called into question
the honor of the Army and the integrity of the officer corps. Initially
a few family members and friends labored on Dreyfus' behalf. They slowly
won the support of important personages like Gambetta and Clemenceau
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while steadily increasing public interest in the case. In 1897 evidence
was produced that indicated Alfred Dreyfus was innocent and another
officer, the aristocrat Major Esterhazy, was the guilty party. So much
publicity now surrounded the case that Esterhazy was brought before a
tribunal. Since the Army had already convicted Dreyfus of the crime,
Major Esterhazy was acquitted. The tribunal chose to believe falsified
documents that supported Dreyfus' guilt. Enraged by this affront to
justice, the famous author Emile Zola published an open letter entitled
J'accuAe, in which he indicated that several senior military officers
including General Mercier, the Minister of War at the time of the con-
viction, General de Boisdeffre, Chief of the General Staff, and others
were guilty of corruption and obstruction of justice. He achieved his
purpose of creating the biggest possible public scandal and forced the
government officially to acknowledge inconsistencies in the Dreyfus
court-martial. In 1899, Dreyfus returned from Devil's Island to stand
trial again.
The implications now exceeded the discrepancies in the original
court-martial. Society was divided into two sides as represented by the
Dreyfusards on one hand and the Army on the other. The Dreyfusards not
only wanted the acquittal of Dreyfus, but also represented those who were
against authoritarianism and clericalism. The Army became the standard-
bearer for political conservatives, monarchists, anti -Semites, and
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Catholics dedicated to order, hierarchy, and authoritarianism. For the
Army, its reputation and position in French society depended on the
"guilt" of Dreyfus.
The Army hierarchy undoubtedly knew that Dreyfus had been convicted
on very scanty evidence. Furthermore, internal investigations uncovered
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incompetent investigative work, perjury, and security violations within
the General Staff itself. Senior officials felt they had little choice
but to continue the condemnation of Dreyfus in order to protect society
from what they believed would be the unsettling effect of the truth.
Shamefully, they used vile tricks and every pretense available to uphold
the Army's "honor." The net result of the retrial was the sustaining of
the conviction. However, in a desperate attempt to deflate the explosive
issue, the court pardoned Dreyfus. The attempt failed. The Dreyfusards
continued to make headway in their cause and in 1906 argued the case
again. The verdict of this trial cleared Dreyfus and annulled the con-
viction. The Army restored Dreyfus to the service amidst much pomp and
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ceremony in which he was made a Knight in the Legion of Honor. After
twelve years of fratricidal bickering over the issues, the case was
closed, but its impact was felt for many years. Although it created no
threat of a revolution or military coup, the Dreyfus Affair was a painful
and distracting event that drained energy from and tested the resolve of
the Third Republic.
Within the Army, the implications of the Dreyfus Affair created
incredible strains on the command hierarchy. Because of the evidence, it
was inevitable that the government would eventually have to oppose the
Army in the Dreyfus Affair. Suddenly, professional officers found them-
selves on the defensive and alienated from the government. The Dreyfus
Affair also renewed and aggravated issues surrounding the separation of
church and state. For a Catholic possessing conservative beliefs, the
Army was about the only career open in state employment. Access to the
French civil service, diplomatic service, and magistracy had been made
more difficult for them in past years. It appeared to republican
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politicians that the Army had become a bastion of Catholic and monarchist
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professional officers.
Many officers were appalled at the blatant miscarriage of justice
covered up by the military hierarchy. They clamored for increased and
broadened reform in the senior echelons. Disenchanted officers unwarily
found allies among the republican-dominated deputies. These adroit
politicians sensed an opportunity to "republicanize" the Army by altering
its conservative trends. Republican politicians used their influence in
the appointment of General Louis Andre* to the post of Minister of War in
1900. The initial intent of the Republican politicians was to reconcile
the Army Officer Corps to republican ideals and lessen its autonomy
within the state. The appointment produced another major scandal instead
of the desired results.
General Andre was a fervent anti-cleric who intended to carry out
the republicanizing of the Army in the tradition of General Boul anger.
His main preoccupation was the protection and advancement of young
republican officers. His main duty, as he envisioned it, was to create
a favorable climate for the promotion of republican officers. To
accomplish this, General Andre" abolished promotion boards and centralized
the process in his ministry. To make this system work, information
obtained outside regular channels was required. He decided to seek
assistance from that solid foundation of French Republicanism—the
Freemasons
.
The Masons were contacted and they agreed to establish a network to
gather information on Army officers. This system eventually became very
sophisticated and efficient. Agents and informants were everywhere—the
barracks, officers' messes, military facilities, and Catholic churches.
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They surreptitiously collected information on an officer's personal
political opinions, social habits, and religious views. The information
was catalogued and transferred to individual index cards or "fiches" and
stored in the War Ministry and some were even kept in the lodge of the
Grand Orient. As an example, the information collected on one profes-
sionally competent commandant stated that he ". . . takes no part in
politics, lets his wife have her own way and sends her six children to
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religious schools and goes to Mass with his family."
Profiles were collected with such information on unsuspecting
officers and gathered together into dossiers for review by the Minister
of War. A covert system so large could not be kept secret for long.
Rumors circulated, and shortly proof surfaced to discredit Andre" and his
cohorts. The public and the government alike were appalled at this
latest scandal. This interference with the promotion system had
demoralizing and disconcerting effects on the professional officer.
Andre and his political supporters, through their manipulation of the
promotion system, attempted to realign the composition of the officer
corps. The exposure of this latest scandal was an intense disappointment
to many professional officers, who sincerely believed that the army was
above political factionalism and that its code of ethics was beyond
reproach.
Throughout this period, there was an escalation in the vehement
rivalry between secular and ecclesiastical groups for control over state
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education. Republican minded politicians labored to ensure secular
control and divest all religions of their educational institutions,
particularly the Catholic church. They wanted complete separation of
State and Church.
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Pressure for reform in the school system began immediately after the
French defeat in 1871. The Republicans attributed partially the nation's
failure and lack of resource to the education provided by clerics and
religious orders. The Republicans, who held legislative majorities in
the 1880' s, were able to institute a program of free education taught by
lay teachers. The program emphasized the sciences along with civic
morality and republican patriotism. Even with official sanction and
support, the new educational system was slow to replace the Jesuits and
other ecclesiastical orders.
In 1902, the new President of the Council of Ministers, Emile Combes,
came to power determined to complete the separation of Church and State.
A law was passed that expelled religious orders from the educational
system. Parochial schools were closed and church-owned property con-
fiscated. The Army was summoned to enforce expropriation. This threw
many officers into a moral dilemma, which aggravated the existing ill-
feelings between the politicians and soldiers. Since the majority of
senior officers were Catholic, they viewed this as a measure designed to
embarrass them and their religious convictions. Many senior officers who
held field commands balked at forcibly entering church property and
arresting dissident clergymen. For the Catholic officer, the moral
quandary deepened when the Pope declared the expropriation illegal and
in violation of canon law.
General Valentin was a Catholic, although according to his daughter,
he did not devoutly practice his faith. Apparently, he was not concerned
with the government's anti-clerical policy because of any deep religious
conviction. Rather, he abhorred the effects of such policies on the
officer corps and the resulting discriminations in promotion and
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assignments. General Valentin's daughter recalled that her father talked
bitterly about this period. Many of his friends resigned their commis-
sions due to the inequities of the system or because they did not want to
make a decision that would so deeply involve their conscience.
How serious and penetrating issues involved in the separation of
Church and State had become is shown in some famous examples. The
distinguished military educator and future World War I supreme commander,
Ferdinand Foch, was passed over for promotion in the early 1900's because
his brother was a Jesuit priest. General Curi&res de Caste! nau, who was
a devout Catholic and accompanied everywhere by his private chaplain, was
known as the "Monk in boots." He had been one of several senior officers
dismissed by General Andre for having an overabundance of "pronounced
religious views." As late as 1917, the Commander-in-Chief, General
Nivelle, who was a stern Protestant, flew into a rage when he discovered
his headquarters was once a Catholic seminary. This law and the anti-
clerical view of the government exacerbated existing schisms in the Army
and in the words of Alistair Home ". . . To a large extent widened the
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same chasm dug by the Affair."
The Dreyfus Affair and the Combes and Andre* episodes were followed
by a wave of anti -militarism as a result of the exposure of corruption
and dishonesty in the military hierarchy. All politicians, especially
the Socialists, distrusted the General Staff. The Socialists, who now
possessed considerable political clout, delighted in the newest con-
scription law which reduced the term of service to two years. Also, in
1906, a regiment in southern France mutinied when ordered to suppress
an uprising staged by economically depressed vineyard workers. From 1907
to 1910, the Army was called upon to quell other acts of social
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disobedience engendered by economic dissatisfaction. The repute of the
Army sank to its lowest point since 1871. The period from about 1900 to
1910 was a very depressing and disturbing time for professional officers.
General Valentin was in metropolitan France serving in regimental garri-
sons and therefore, undoubtedly felt the impact of these discrediting and
demoralizing events upon the army in general and the officer corps in
particular. Officers tended generally to accuse politicians, especially
Socialists, of paying more attention to political connivance than to the
discipline of the Army. General Valentin alluded to these sentiments as
late as 1914:
I know very well that in peacetime it is difficult to
have a firm hand in discipline. If you do the
Socialists and anti -militarist clique will be on
your back. . . .But, nevertheless, duty before
everything. . . .
20 August 1914
The years 1910 through 1914 witnessed a Revec£ national in France.
It was one of those nebulous but nevertheless real phenomena in history
that defies complete comprehension. In essence public opinion towards
the military reversed and the army began to recover from its experiences
of the past decade. The main reason for this shift in popularity was the
increase in tension between France and Germany in international affairs.
This sparked memories of la Revanche and a revival of martial virtues.
The two most important legislative acts passed during this period con-
cerned familiar issues—conscription and reorganization of the high
command. In 1913, the Assembly obligated young men to serve three years
instead of two. This law was greeted with enthusiasm from most segments
of society. In 1911, the function of the Chief of the General Staff was
combined with that of the Commanding General. This new arrangement
eradicated the duality of the old command structure and gave extensive
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powers to the new position. The Chief of the General Staff would now
personally direct the preparation of war plans during mobilization, as
well as the concentration of field armies before the initial campaign.
Although these laws were formulated for strictly military reasons, they
nonetheless represented the renewed feeling of confidence in the military
and its popular appeal.
In summary, it is important to mention that the position of the Army
in the Third Republic had great significance. During the years from 1871
to 1914, the Army developed a separate, corporate military structure.
The professional officer corps itself became increasingly separated from
government and society. It evolved into an exclusionist entity with
social and political sentiments. The evolution of the relationship
between the Army and the State fell into three distinct but interrelated
phases which had an impact on the professional officers in General
Valentin's generation. From 1871 until approximately 1894, French
society was generally supportive of the military. The humiliation of the
defeat of 1870 was a strong bond between politician, private citizen, and
soldier. Beginning with the Dreyfus Affair in 1894 and lasting until
1910-1911, the Army experienced scandalous and disreputable distractions.
French society lapsed into a period of disinterest in military affairs,
except for the scandals; and the Assembly was strongly influenced by
Socialists, pacificists, and anti -militarists. The Army reached the
nadir of its public support. In 1910, there was a national revival,
caused primarily by the concern for the military posture of France as
compared to Germany. The Army made gains in its effort to modernize the
military force structure and counter the demoralization in the officer
corps resulting from the preceding years of discreditable publicity.
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It can be imagined that the professional Army officer, believing in
the institution of the Army as a symbol of the vitality and strength of
France was indeed perplexed and sometimes demoralized with the role of
the military. Not only were there recent scandals, but also the memory
of the horror of the Paris Commune, monarchist rivalries, the threatened
coup d'etat of Boulanger, and the impassioned religious-education
controversy. Against this background of unsettling influences, profes-
sional Army officers prepared for the long awaited la. Jtzvanche..
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CHAPTER IV
Preparation for War
The military mind always imagines that the next
war will be on the same lines as the last. That
has never been the case and never will be.
Ferdinand Foch
France astonished the world with her rapid recuperation and recovery
in the years following the Franco-Prussian War. The physical results of
the lost war were rapidly eliminated. The trial and conviction of Marshal
Bazaine for alleged treasonous collaboration in the capitulation of Metz
partially absolved the collective disgrace of the Army. The war
indemnity imposed by the Treaty of Frankfurt was paid, and the German
Army of Occupation departed France in 1873. The French economy recovered
and prospered. By 1878, the Paris Exposition demonstrated to the world
that France had recovered her claim as the international capital of the
affluent hoot mondz. Even the Prussians looked upon France with envy.
One popular German proverb proclaimed a person should be "As happy as God
in France." Nowhere was this renaissance more pronounced than in the
Army and the technical military aspects concerned with reform and the
preparation for la Revanche..
In their reorganization, reformers modeled the Army after the
Prussians. A new spirit was infused into the officer corps. Professional
officers discarded the old Imperial Army tradition of the Cafe and the
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vacuous routine of garrison life. Instead they adopted a more energetic
and intellectually stimulating life style. They studied the basic
intellectual elements of war and the scientific aspects of industrialized
warfare. Officers analyzed the campaigns of 1870 in order to find the
reasons for their defeat. This intellectual surge manifested itself in
the emergence of books and periodicals, as discussed previously, which
propelled the revitalization of the Army and, in particular, the officer
corps.
The National Assembly passed laws dealing with conscription, cadres
and effectives, general officers, promotions, and internal structure and
administration. The Ecolz dz Ga.znA.Zt a staff college, was established to
further military education and prepared officers for positions of
increased responsibility. The ZznXxz dz hautzA Btudz& nULUoAJizi pre-
pared senior officers for division, corps, and larger unit command and
staff positions. Military agencies such as the General Staff and Coyu><lII
bupitvlzun. dz la Guzaaz underwent revision by soldiers and politicians
alike in an effort to project and plan for general mobilization. These
steps were important advancements in the rebuilding of the Army and in
training the professional officer corps. Despite the positive impact of
these progressive steps, the military policy of France displayed a marked
sense of inferiority from 1871 until the 1890' s.
2
It was as D. W. Brogan
stated "Defensive in spirit," if not timid.
The loss of the frontier provinces of Alsace and Lorraine deprived
France of her natural defensive barriers. Consequently, the hereditary
enemy was brought to within 200 miles of Paris. This necessitated the
creation of new defensive barriers. The task was entrusted to an engi-
neer general, Se>e* de Riviere. He constructed a system of two continuous
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lines of sunken forts. One line ran from the Swiss Border to Epinal;
then from Toul to Verdun. It was designed to canalize the German
attacker and pin him, so the French maneuver forces could envelop his
flanks and eventually surround him. The plan had a major flaw--the
Belgian frontier was left unfortified except for a few scattered for-
tresses because of Belgian neutrality. The underlying strategy was to
allow the Germans to initiate offensive action and engage themselves in
desperate assaults on fortified positions. The German Army decimated
from these futile frontal assaults, could then be defeated by an over-
whelming counter-offensive. Such was the doctrine of the General Staff.
By 1900, the Army had recovered its military prowess and self-confi-
dence and in fact, had made significant contributions to military science.
French officers could indeed be proud of their achievements. The French
Army had developed and adopted the Lebel , the first magazine rifle. This
weapon was superior to any infantry assault weapon and remained so until
1914. They had produced the 75-millimeter rapid-firing field gun which
was superior to the German 77-millimeter and British 18-pounder even in
1914.
4
Also, French officers in regiments of the line took enthusiastic
interest in training and preparation for war. They displayed an
increased concern for the well -being of the poilu and his morale.
Around 1900, there was a concern on the part of some officers to
change the strategic posture of France as represented by the de Rivi&res
defense system. This new breed of officers found this defensive attitude
very distasteful. They wanted radical changes in France's military policy
to suit it to their revived obsession with la Rnvanchz. As a result of
their studies of the campaigns of 1870, French officers concluded that
the primary reason for the success of Prussian arms was their superior
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offensive strategy. This analysis resulted in French officers accepting
two interrelated concepts that would have a significant impact on the
preparation for and conduct of World War I campaigns. First, the offen-
sive replaced the defense as the primary element in military strategy.
Secondly, French officers generally tended to discard or misinterpret the
role of massed and rapid firepower on the modern battlefield.
Among the new generation of officers, one in particular would
influence significantly his fellow and subordinate officers—Ferdinand
Foch. In 1894, Foch was appointed professor at the tcolz dz Guzaaz;
later he became the Director of the Ecolz Su.peAA.zuAz dz la Gllzaaz.
Influenced by Karl von Clausewitz and an analyst of the campaigns of
1870, he lectured students on the overwhelming advantages of the strategic
offense over the defense. He later published two books expounding his
doctrine, which J. F. C. Fuller has called "The new testament of the
French Army." Foch's doctrine of the offense contained both abstract and
empirical qualities. On one side, he preached itan vital, the all-
conquering will to defeat the foe. Its success depended on the {uaqa
gallicaz, the violent fury of a French assault, to overcome any diffi-
culty imposed by a fortified defense. Two examples of this doctrine
follow:
A lost battle is a battle one thinks one has lost.
Any improvement of firearms is ultimately bound to
add strength to the offensive.
The supposition that any improvement in firepower would benefit the
attacker lacked a sense of awareness in battlefield realities. Apparently
this line of thought did not consider that a defender could fire faster,
reload quicker, and more accurately acquire a target than an exposed,
advancing infantryman.
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On the other side of Foch's offensive doctrine was the element of
iQsittl. This more practical aspect of the offense addressed the neces-
sity of protection from defensive fires, the establishment of advance
guards, and the maintenance of discipline.
Foch's advocacy of the offense captured the minds of his students
and paved the way for a complete reversal of military policy. The new
doctrine would have the French take the initiative by launching a massive
offensive across the German border. The majority of French officers
accepted only the abstract side of Foch's doctrine, itaun. vital, and dis-
carded the elements of bdJizXt as unimportant. The essence of what Foch
preached was a reiteration of von Clausewitz in that the victor would
ultimately have to attack. However, some officers carried this to the
extreme and forged it into a my&tlquz.
One officer in particular, Lieutenant Colonel Loyzeaux de
Grandmaison, evangelized zealously the principle of the offensive and
contributed significantly to the myttiquz. As Chief of Military Opera-
tions, he preached enthusiastically that the offense was the only
operation worthy of the French soldier. He expressed a military philo-
sophy that "electrified" his audience, showing his fellow officers that
France would win a war with Germany with the o^ena-tve 2t ow&umcz,
offensive to the limit. In essence, this belief held that the doctrine
of the offense should govern all phases and be the principal considera-
tion in the planning of tactical operations. Lieutenant Colonel de
Grandmaison's extravagant offensive thesis was, in Alistair Home's
words, "semi -mystical ."
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In the offensive, imprudence is the best of
assurances. . . . For the attack only two things
are necessary: to know where the enemy is and to
decide what to do. What the enemy decides to do
is of no consequence.
This element of the offense replaced the defense as the official
doctrine in military education to the exclusion of any other teaching,
especially the defense. The student-officers, who would be unit command-
ers in the coming conflict, became hostile to any policy that distracted
from the offensive initiative. Advocates of the offensive minimized the
effects of barriers and improvements in such weapons as the magazine-
loaded rifle, machinegun, and field artillery and regarded them as only
temporary obstacles to the ofltfeJU-cue 21 oatiance.
The offense was to be conducted almost entirely by infantry opera-
tions. The French infantry in their red pantaloons— "so the Germans
could see their furious numbers and be terrified"—would be the deciding
factor in the battle. The cavalry and artillery occupied only secondary
and supplementary roles. The artillery would only support the attack,
not prepare it. The field guns would remain silent until the assault
was launched by the infantry. The cavalry would screen the flanks and
provide security to the infantry force.
To the French officer, £&m and esprit were everything. These are
important virtues in the conduct of the offense, and they fit comfortably
into the character of General Valentin's generation. Like other members
of his generation, General Valentin believed battlefield courage was an
integral part of the separatist attitude predominant in the professional
officer corps and was irrevocably linked to personal honor. The unwaver-
ing stipulation of this system held that courageous example was the
highest or most important ingredient to effective officership. The
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devotion to this idea can best be conveyed in General Valentin's own
words from his Order Number 2:
Men from Burgundy and other Frenchmen who
form the 27th Regiment, I am counting on you
as you can always count on me. I will give you
the example in every circumstance, you only have
to follow me and I am certain none of you will
falter.
Dying for your Vtvbxiz is a beautiful destiny.
Toujour zyi kvanZ. Vive, la 27tk! \JI\jz la. Vnancz.
5 September 1914
The passage indicated also that sacrifices might be necessary to ensure
the success of the offensive. Advocates of the offensive believed that
troops should be trained to withstand any losses in their advance to the
enemy line. Once the enemy line was reached, the bayonet would redress
the balance; and the enemy, driven from his position, would suffer more
losses in his retreat than the victors in their advance.
It is difficult to determine accurately why this remarkable reverse
in military policy occurred. Possibly, French officers became too over-
confident of the capabilities of the revitalized army. This overconfi-
dence could have impaired their sense of balance and judgment in battle-
field scenarios and realities. They desired greatly to reassert the
martial qualities of the French Army and to reaffirm their professional
standing with the public. Another explanation from General Valentin
stated:
In France, as I have said before, we have the
unfortunate habit carrying everything to the
extreme. In military things, as in others, a new
idea started by a maAjqucuvt personality is not
only adopted immediately but is accepted as the
panacea. And soon everybody preaches it and accepts
it. The idea of the offensive is one of those
ideas.
5 September 1914
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In this passage, General Valentin used the word maAquani to describe a
personality that was remarkable. This may indicate that the officer
corps was very susceptible to men or ideas that appealed to the martial
glory of France. This inclination would be particularly acute in a
professional officer corps that had experienced unpleasant and discon-
certing events such as those from 1894 to 1910. Regardless of the
reason, the spirit of the new offense permeated the professional officer
corps, who abandoned the defense as a productive means of prosecuting
war. This makes an interesting irony of the mentality of World War I
officers. Much of the new weaponry had been developed by French officers,
who should have been keenly aware of the tremendous advances in military
technology. French officers also observed military operations in
Manchuria and South Africa, which indicated that improvements in
weaponry and barrier systems strengthened the defense. Advocates of the
offense misinterpreted the lessons of these battlefields. Rather than
reinforcing the defense, they believed that innovations, such as the
machine gun and magazine-loaded rifle, would strengthen the offense;
therefore the attacker, not the defender, would benefit from increased
firepower. The issue over the field uniform of the infantryman provides
an example of how extreme the advocacy of the offense had become. In the
decade before World War I, the British and Germans had outfitted their
infantrymen in a uniform of an unobtrusive color. The French infantry
still wore the red kepi and red pantaloons of the Second Empire. Efforts
to change the uniform met with a response that was pure Grandmaison in
that to change to a drab color would lower the morale of the troops and
detract from the lotion. gatUaxz. This would result in the offense losing
its momentum and neutralizing the ilojn. vaJjoJL. This obsession is best
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described by a former French War Minister defending the traditional
uniform. "Eliminate the red trousers?" War Minister E*tienne cried,
"Never! Le paMalon lougz, c' <u>t la. F/umce!"
There were some senior officers who did not accept the offense
entirely as professed by Foch and Grandmaison. The most famous examples
include the future marshal, Henri-Philippe Pe*tain and the Vice-President
of the Con&zli SupinJ.zuA do. la. Gu2AA.z t Augustin-Edouard Michel. Pe*tain,
for a time professor of infantry tactics, was considered a doctrinal
heretic and slated for normal retirement until the failure of the 1916
offensives vindicated his ideas on the defense. Michel was removed from
office in 1911 because his proposed strategy would place the French Army
in defensive positions along the Belgian border. However, the war diary
of General Valentin indicated that at least some regimental officers were
concerned with the extremism of the offense and realized the importance
of firepower on the battlefield. According to General Valentin, who
wrote in 1914:
Before a certain group (of officers) achieved
publicity by re-establishing the school of the
offensive in France, we were trying, at least
in the provinces, to conduct combat training #
maneuvers more wisely than the Army of the East
by taking into consideration the non-existent
fires. At least we simulated the effects of
fires that could have and would have existed!
5 September 1914
This passage demonstrated the sentiments of regimental officers who were
genuinely concerned with realistic combat training and the effect of
firepower. General Valentin's reference to the Army of the East suggests
a lack of professional respect for officers in those units. Officers in
*
NOTE: The Army of the East refers to the main grouping of French
Armies on the Eastern border.—gms
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regiments that were components of the Army of the East were supposedly
the most promising and gifted in the professional officer corps.
Colonial officers, such as General Valentin, felt apart from and
resented officers in metropolitan regiments, who practiced parade-
ground maneuvers and attended staff schools; while they participated in
colonial campaigns. Colonial officers looked contemptuously upon the set-
piece scenarios and the synchronization of battlefield tactics as
practiced by metropolitan regiments.
General Valentin did not object to the offense in principle. On the
contrary, he wholeheartedly accepted it, but not with a blind application.
He demonstrated his feeling when he wrote:
I could not be more in favor of the principle of
the offensive. It is part of my character and
attitude but not this extraordinary exaggeration.
For me, to be offensive minded means to have in
your heart the firm intention to go to your adver-
sary in order to crush him and take him at the
throat. But there is a manner to get at the enemy.
Yes, there is a correct manner: The important
thing is how and when!
!
5 September 1914
General Valentin suggested ways to increase the sense of realism in order
to enhance combat training. Apparently he and his associates advocated
a method of umpiring, as indicated when he continued with his comments on
the offensive:
We preached with energy the idea of using anbJJjiz
(umpires). We were ridiculed and called foolish.
We thought that if we could not represent the
effects of fires and the subsequent demoralization
(among the troops) our maneuvers did not resemble
the realities of war. We must consider the effects
of fires and have not developed a better way than
the ajibitnjdQZ (umpire system).
5 September 1914
General Valentin and similar thinking officers desired to inject
realism into the spirit of the offense. This can be attributed in part
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to his service in the colonies where he experienced hostile natives.
Though fighting in the colonies was far from a "modern" battlefield, it
nevertheless exposed colonial officers to the effects of battle and
tactical operations. It was a source of first-hand combat experience for
many officers.
Professional officers in General Valentin's generation followed
basically two career patterns: colonial service or regimental duty in
metropolitan France. Some officers decided that serving in metropolitan
France was too stale with its emphasis on military education and theory.
Action-minded officers opted for service in the colonies where first-hand
experience in operations and administration could be obtained. The
desire for glory and military action drove men like Gallieni and Lyautey
to Tonkin, Algeria, and Equatorial Africa. Through their efforts, the
French overseas empire was established and maintained. The successful
administration of the colonies proved economically beneficial to France.
It also provided the French Army with professional officers who had
experienced the exigencies of a battlefield.
By 1914, the doctrine of the offense, as theorized by Foch and
Grandmaison, found expression in general war plans. Plan XVII, under
whose direction the campaign in 1914 was begun, provided for the defeat
of the German Army by outmaneuvering it with offensive action. As
history records, the French leaders in 1914, as in 1870, disbelieved that
the Germans could make effective soldiers from their reservists. Thus,
the French intelligence bureau was self-deceived into the actual number
of Germans opposing the main French armies. The French General Staff
rationalized that the Germans could not possibly field enough divisions
to weight the right flank sufficiently while maintaining adequate forces
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1n the center. The French intended to attack in the center and swing up
through central Germany. The French General Staff believed that the more
German divisions used on the right flank, the better for the French to
execute their grand offensive through the center. When war came, the
French attack was delivered against an enemy strong enough to absorb it
and then repulse it and simultaneously, with sufficient forces, execute
the devastating offensive, known as the Schlieffen Plan. This ulti-
mately led to disaster for both belligerents.
The strength and weakness of the French Army in 1914 had curious
resemblances to its strength and weakness in 1870. There was the same
reliance on a few weapons, without a sufficient study of their tactical
application, capabilities, and limitations; there was the same under-
estimation of the potential enemy, and the same overestimation of the
a
martial prowess of the French military. The French Army practiced self-
deception and in so doing, caused many officers and men to lose their
lives for an abstract ideal; reinforced with a lack of proper training,
officers went into battle in the spirit of Grandmaison.
The object of war is to impose one's will on the enemy until he
surrenders or is rendered incapable of effective resistance; the means of
imposing this surrender is battle, and no defensive battle could give the
g
results of an offensive battle. This synthesis of von Clausewitz and
Foch manifested itself not only in strategic war plans, but in tactical
application on the horrible battlefields of World War I. The results
were predictable; by the end of 1915, France had lost 50 per cent of its
Regular Army officers. Officers declined to make themselves less
inconspicuous by carrying a weapon. Instead they led the way brandishing
their canes and were picked off by the hundreds.
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When Plan XVII and the Schlieffen Plan failed in achieving strategic
results, battles during the period of trench warfare became dismal
stereotypes. First the long wait in the squalid trenches, then the
attack across a quagmire of mud to the enemy lines. Close-in fighting
with the bayonet took place, then a brief pause before the enemy counter-
attacked; unable to hold the position with too few men, the French were
forced to retreat back across the quagmire to their own lines. General
Valentin testified to this sordid battle scenario. He preserved for
posterity the reason for the incredibly high casualities, when shortly
after the war began he wrote:
... In front of the German Army these assaults,
as if a furious torrent, might occasionally suc-
ceed, but more often failed and usually cost us
huge losses. The Germans apparently knew what
to expect. They always waited for us behind
fortified and concealed positions. They let us
advance, then when our furious torrential attack
was broken by heavy fires, they in turn would
attack and push us back (to our own lines).
5 September 1914
The French Army prepared for its great task in 1914 by dutifully
training and preparing contingency plans and battle scenarios. These
efforts in preparation were based on a strategic offensive concept
designed for a quick victory over the German Army. The all-out offensive
would be the principal ingredient in ensuring the victory. The
separatism of the professional officer corps provided the seeds and
fertile climate for the growth and development of this doctrine.
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CONCLUSION
France will have but one thought: to reconstitute
her forces, gather her energy, nourish her sacred
anger, raise her young generation to form an army
of the whole people, to work without cease, to
study the methods and skills of our enemies, to
become again a great France, the France of 1792,
the France of an idea with a sword. Then one day
she will be irresistible. Then she will take back
Alsace-Lorraine.
Victor Hugo (1802-1885)
The victory over Germany in 1918 was the realization of a goal
toward which a full generation of French officers had dedicated their
personal and professional lives. The French officer corps labored over
four decades to raise the Army from the shambles of a catastrophic defeat
to the pedestal of military victory. If military success is determined
only by the end result, then French officers succeeded in their great
mission. Their endeavors to reform and revitalize the French Army
achieved the treasured la. Revanche.
General Valentin saw the victory as more than just the superiority
of French arms over the German Army. His comments from the 1918 diary
reflect a deep sense of historical significance attached to the military
victory.
On all fronts, French and Allied troops
advance. . . . The Germans are concerned that
we will not stop and just occupy our ex-frontier
of 1870, but will occupy the frontier of 1815.
I hope we do, because all of this territory is
ours and should come back to us. I don't see
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why the Prussians should reign the left bank
of the Rhine. ... We should take it all back.
We have to know how to take advantage of
our victory. We need to take the opportunity.
The occasion will not arise again.
27 November 1918
General Valentin, like other members of his generation, believed
sincerely that France should take the opportunity to reclaim her former
territories. He undoubtedly felt that the Army should be allowed to
exercise military force so that France could regain her self-respect and
security. The tone of his words indicated that he believed the Army had
vindicated itself and unshouldered the burden of the defeat of 1870.
The road to victory was long and agonizing, not only in terms of
lives and resources, but in the development of the French Army, and in
particular the professional officer corps. The task of rebuilding the
Army after 1871 fell primarily to the professional military. Generally,
politicians agreed that professional officers could best carry through
the necessary reforms and preparations for war, but this did not prevent
serious conflicts from arising. Each government possessed a different
philosophy on how to initiate reforms and what the Army's reform programs
should be. This meant that politicians entered frequently into an area
that the military believed was its sole sphere of influence. The feeling
of separation and alienation grew as different governments came and then
departed the Third Republic. As a result, the relationship between the
soldier and the politician fluctuated from compromise to hostility to
toleration.
The relationship between the Army and the State was basically
between a conservative, anti -democratic, hierarchical institution and an
increasingly democratic, skeptical parliament. During the period from
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1871 to 1914, controversial political issues and embarrassing or damaging
events placed incredible strain on this relationship. In the political
and social arena, Boulangism, the scandals of the early 1900' s, the
debate over the conscription laws, and the issue concerning the permanent
establishment of the General Staff propelled officers into the limelight.
With the exception of a few, most officers had a genuine desire to avoid
the controversies and in fact, considered themselves above the political
in-fighting. Nevertheless, they were dragged into the fracas thus dis-
tracting their attention and resources from the continuous improvement of
the military posture of France. Most officers, especially after the
debarring acts in 1884, according to David Ralston, held "Almost a
superstitious fear" of politics and regarded politicians with haughty
disdain.
Throughout the period from 1871 to 1914, to be a professional army
officer was to occupy an uncertain social position and be subject to
ideological and political tensions. Some officers reacted to this sense
of insecurity by either grasping at traditional values or by entrenching
themselves in the bureaucracy of military hierarchy. The defeat of 1870
and the political and ideological attacks from Leftist politicians caused
professional officers to withdraw into their own world; thus deepening
the feeling of separation where their special virtues could be cultivated,
Instead of professional officers seeing themselves as leaders of a
progressive and technologically advanced institution, they preferred to
confine themselves, as Theodore Zeldin has written, "To the cult of
individual prowess."
This "cult" produced the mentality that caused the doctrinal shift
from the defense to offense in the years prior to World War I. The
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professional officer corps entered the war with their tactical and
strategic ideas based on the all-out offensive. The doctrine remained
unchanged through 1916, as evidenced by the Marne, Somme and Verdun
battlefields.
The Army eventually overcame the stigma of its defeat in 1870 and
the deficiencies resulting from a separate, distinct officer corps. It
served the Third Republic faithfully by completing the cycle of defeat,
recovery, and preparation for war. The French Army's success in 1918
will remain a testament to the strength and resolve of the French officer
corps, if, in fact, the affirmation of man's ultimate folly.
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French history from 1870 to 1914 provides the reader with a histor-
ical profile of an army as it recovers from defeat, experiences political
and social distractions, and prepares for the next war. The thesis
intends to examine the professional soldiers who officered this army and
concentrate on the major political, military and social events that
influenced their role in French society. The paper will describe the
sentiments and attitudes that prevaded the officer corps and caused
their estrangement from the main stream of politico-social life and
their inflexible devotion to principles that almost led to military
disaster, if not, in fact to moral negligence.
The majority of the thesis is devoted to the relationship between
the Army and the State, the soldier and the politician in the Third
Republic. Throughout this period, one unprecedented and novel problem
emerged to dominate that relationship: the co-existence of a republican
regime with increasing democratic ideals and a large standing army,
officered by a caste of professional soldiers. This situation greatly
strained the tenuous nature and aggravated the frequent instability of
the Third Republic. The weaknesses supposedly inherent in democratic
governments were particularly amplified by the circumstances surrounding
the Third Republic's establishment. Events such as the Dreyfus, Andre*,
and Combes Affairs placed incredible and agonizing strain on the rela-
tionship between the professional officer corps and the republican
elements of the government. The thesis deals with each of these events
for its impact and effect on the Army and its perceived role in French
society.
French society, its government and military establishment, though
often at odds with each other, united in one commanding way— an intense
fear and loathing of the newly created German Empire. Bismarck created
the Second Reich at great expense to all Frenchmen. Cries for la.
Revanche, echoed throughout France for more than forty years. It was the
one factor that could and did unite the country.
French officers during this period were overly conscious of the
military blunders that caused national disgrace in 1870-1871. Their
professional lives were oriented toward the "day of reckoning" and their
institutions reflected this intense force. General Joseph Valentin
(1863-1938) was one such officer. Though he is an unknown professional
soldier, he is the epitome of his generation. His career spanned this
period and his experiences and personal reflections are recorded in his
unpublished 1914-1918 war diary. His candid thoughts and comments as
recorded there, partially form the basis for the thesis. In addition,
numerous secondary sources were used to provide valuable background and
complementary information. Though the diary was not used extensively,
the selections convey sufficiently the emotional intensity and thoughts
of a generation of officers confronted with inflexible military dogma
and the vicissitudes of political involvement.
The victory over the Germans in 1918 was the realization of a goal
toward which a generation of French officers had labored. Four decades
of constant and unceasing effort had guided the French Army from the
shambles of catastrophic defeat in 1870 to the position of military
victors in 1918. The great task of rebuilding and reforming the Army
after 1871 was primarily the responsibility of the military. The
thesis shows that this was not accomplished without distracting and dis-
comforting events in and to the Army, and in particular, the officer
corps.
